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Criminal Procedure-Right To Defend Pro Se
In Seale v. Hoffman,' the defendant Seale, one of eight charged in a
much-publicized Chicago trial2 with conspiring to violate the recentlyadopted federal antiriot act,- sought injunctive relief and a declaratory
judgment to test the constitutionality of those proceedings. One of Seale's
primary contentions was that he was denied his constitutional right to
appear and to defend pro se in his trial. The federal district court dismissed the complaint on its own motion on the ground that the action
should properly have been brought to a higher court on appeal or in a
mandamus proceeding because a district court is without authority to
review the rulings and procedures of another federal trial court.'
Moreover, the court concluded that Seale's claim of a right to defend
himself, under the circumstances, raised no constitutional issue conferring
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Seale, it was noted, had been
represented by an attorney who had cross-examined sixteen government
witnesses on his behalf, Seale had exhibited gross contempt of court, and he
had been on trial on a charge of considerable legal complexity. As the right
of a criminal defendant to dismiss his counsel during trial in order to
appear pro se is qualified by the trial court's discretionary assessment of
the extent of potential disruption, delay, confusion of the jury, and
prejudice to the defendant, the denial of Seale's request was not erroneous.

5

Seale's asserted right to defend pro se is by no means novel. The right
of a 6riminally accused not to have a lawyer pre-dates the Bill of Rights.0
Currently, the right to defend pro se in the federal courts is guaranteed by
congressional statute. Section 1654 of title twenty-eight of the United
States Code provides: "In all courts of the United States the parties may
plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel .... "7 Thirtyseven states provide constitutionally for the right to appear pro se; some
allow the accused the right to be heard, or to defend, in person and by
counsel, 8 others grant the right for a defendant to defend in person or by
'306 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
United States v. Dellinger, - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ill. 1970).
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101, 2102 (Supp. 1970).
306 F. Supp. at 331-3-2.
rId. at 332.
'See United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 274 (2d Cir. 1964).
728 U.S.C. § 1654 (1964).
'ARIz. CoNsT. art. 2, § 24; ARK. CONsT. art. 2, § 10; CA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13;
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counsel,' and the remainder provide the right for an accused to defend
either by himself, by counsel, or both.1" Statutes guarantee the right in
1
other states.'
The Supreme Court has considered the right of a criminally accused
to defend pro se, but in an indirect and somewhat equivocal fashion.
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann'2 seemingly held the right to be
of constitutional stature:
The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to
dispense wth a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms. They rest on
considerations that go to the substance of an accused's position before
the law. The public conscience must be satisfied that fairness dominates
the administration of justice . . . Essential fairness is lacking if an
accused cannot put his case effectively in court. But the Constitution
does not force a lawyer upon a defendant .... 13
Speaking in a different case, the Court later held:
Neither the historic conception of Due Process nor the vitality it
derives from progressive standards of justice denies a person the
right to defend himself or to confess guilt . . . . the Constitution
.. . does not require that under all circumstances counsel be forced
upon a defendant.14
The Court's position in the above case seems to indicate that concepts of
due process and assistance of counsel allow, but do not positively confer,
the right to defend pro se. In yet another case the Court intimated that
the right is basically statutory.'5
CoLo. CONST. art. 2, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 9; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 7; IDAHO
CONST. art. 1, § 13; ILL. CoNsT. art. 2, §9; IND. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13; Kyr. CONST.
Bill of Rights, § 11; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 18(a); MONT. CONST. art. 3, § 16; NEv.

CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.H. CONST. Bill of Rights, art. 15; N.M. CoNST. art. 2, § 14;
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13; OHio CoNsT. art. 1, § 10; OxLA.
CONST. art. 2, § 20; ORE. CoNsT. art. 1, § 11; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9; S.D. CoNsT.
art. 6, § 7; TENN. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 12; VT. CONST. ch. 1,
art. 10; Wis. CONST. art. 1, §7. See LA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
'KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 10; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 12; NEB. CONST.
art. 1, § 11; WAsH. CONsT. art. 1, § 22.
'0 ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 6; FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 11; ME. CONST.
art. 1, § 6; Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 26; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. 1,
§ 10.
"E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-11 (1969).
" 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
" Id. at 279.
"Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 174-75 (1946).
"Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285-86 (1948).
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Relying upon Adams several federal appellate courts have held that
the right is constitutionally protected, either by the sixth amendment
as correlative to right to counsel, 16 or as implicit in both the fifth and
sixth amendments, 17 or by the fifth amendment's due process clause alone.1 8
Further support for the constitutional position has been found in section
thirty-five of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which states that parties might
"plead and manage their own causes personally."10 Because this Act predated the sixth amendment, it has been asserted that the sixth amendment
was intended to include the guarantee to defend pro se as well as to enjoy
assistance of counsel. 20 However, the more prevalent position, both federal
and state, holds that although the Constitution allows the criminally
accused the right to manage and conduct his defense personally, nevertheless "the right is statutory in character and does not rise to the dignity
of one conferred and guaranteed by the Constitution. 2 1
One problem that arises because of a finding that the right is a constitutional one concerns the proper disposition by an appellate court of a
22
case in which that right had been denied. Before Chapman v. California,
10 Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965).
United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
MacKenna v. Ellis, 263 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1959) (semble).
The substantial equivalent of that statute is currently
1 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1964).
oUnited States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 274 (2d Cir. 1964).
21 Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1959). This position
seems buttressed by analogy to the right to jury trial. Clearly, the right to jury
trial and the right to counsel are similar in that in given situations one might
reasonably elect to his advantage not to exercise his constitutional privilege. Indeed, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1967), holding the right to jury trial
for non-petty crimes binding upon the states, the Court acknowledged that a
"jury trial has 'its weaknesses and the potential for misuse.'" Id. at 156. Nonetheless, it was early held on both federal and state levels that a defendant could
not waive his right to jury trial. E.g., Low v. United States, 169 F. 86 (6th Cir.
1909); Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128 (1858).
In 1930 it was held that a defendant could waive jury trial consistent with the
United States Constitution (Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930)), but it
was much later before most states decided that a waiver was possible under their
constitutions. E.g., People v. Spegal, 5 Ill. 2d 211, 125 N.E.2d 468 (1955); People
v. Carroll, 7 Misc. 2d 581, 161 N.Y.S.2d 339 (King County Ct. 1957). In Singer
v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965), an undivided Court rejected the claim that
the right to waive a jury trial is guaranteed by the Constitution and found it
"difficult to understand how the petitioner can submit . . . that to compel a
defendant . . . to undergo a jury trial against his will is contrary to . . . due

process." Id. at 36. Indeed, "[t]he ability to waive a constitutional right does not
ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right." Id. at
34-35.
22386

U.S. 18 (1967).
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which announced a reasonable-doubt test for harmless constitutional error,
the breach would have required automatic reversal regardless of the absence of prejudice to the defendant.23 It could be argued that, despite
Chapman,automatic reversal is still necessary since the degree of prejudice
suffered by the defendant through a denial of this right could be estimated only inferentially and rarely, if ever, proved harmless beyond reasonable doubt."' Presumably this result need not follow were the right of
non-constitutional origin. 25 It is not unreasonable to expect that courts
might more narrowly define the circumstances in which one might appear
pro se in order to minimize the possibility that defendants, afforded effective assistance of counsel, would receive the windfall of a new trial by
26
proving a denial of the right while not proving any prejudice.
Another problem suggested by the constitutional position is waiver.
If the right to defend pro se is a constitutional one "correlative" to that
of assistance of counsel, it could be contended that it too would require
competent and intelligent waiver.2 To the extent that an intelligent
waiver means that the defendant was at least cognizant of his right, the
requirement would violate the admonition of one court that "if notice of
the right [to defend pro se] had to be given, the task of administering
the overriding constitutional policy in favor of granting a lawyer to
every person accused of a serious crime would become unduly treacherous."

28

A final problem with the constitutional position concerns one of logic.
No doubt a creditable argument could be advanced that the right to
defend oneself is inherent in the concept of due process. 9 But the argu23
See, e.g., United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1964).
21 See United States v. Guerra, 334 F.2d 138, 146 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1964). The Court
in Chapman seemingly recognized that certain classes of constitutional error still require automatic reversal and cited Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(right to counsel) as an example. 386 U.S. at 23 n.8.
"E.g., Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29, 33 (5th Cir. 1965); Butler v.
United States, 317 F.2d 249, 258 (8th Cir. 1963); Brown v. United States, 264
F.2d20363, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
See Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). At least one court placing the right
to defend pro se on a constitutional level did so impliedly by requiring that the trial
court "by recorded colloquy" apprise the accused of his alternate rights to defend
by counsel or pro se. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964).
. 8United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1965).
At common law the right actively to be represented by counsel was extremely
limited; the attorney acted primarily as advisor to the defendant on points of law.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). The heightened stature of the right to be
defended by counsel does not necessarily dictate for purposes of due process a

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

ment that this right is based on the sixth amendment as "correlative" to
the right to assistance of counsel produces a questionable corollary itself.
After all, to defend pro se is, for whatever reason, not to defend through
counsel. These procedures are related only in that they are antagonistic
to each other in the usual situation if the rationale of the numerous cases
supporting right to counsel is accepted." Thus, if the right to counsel is
indeed "one of the safeguards... deemed necessary to insure fundamental
human rights of life and liberty"'" and is binding upon the states8 2 as
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"33 it is difficult to conceive
how the right to defend pro se, necessarily not "one of the safeguards,"
could, by virtue of this opposite relationship alone, be a constitutional right
and, moreover, could emanate from the same source, the sixth amendment.34 As the holdings of the Supreme Court hardly command the finding
that the right is constitutional, 5 and as there is little on policy grounds
to recommend such a stance, the non-constitutional position is preferable.
Aside from the problem of whether the right to defend pro se has a
constitutional basis, the case treatment of it has been relatively uniform.
The typical statement is that a criminal defendant who is sui juris and
mentally competent possesses this right, 6 , and it has been termed "incorresponding diminution of the privilege to be heard personally, particularly when
the element of individual autonomy is weighed in the balance.
"'E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 145 (1932).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
"2See cases cited note 30 supra.

" Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Quaere whether the right
to defend pro se if more extensively held to be a guarantee of the Bill of Rights
would be "absorbed" through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause? At
least one state court decision already holds that it is. Capetta v. State, 204 So. 2d
913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
"' This argument is perhaps unwittingly suggested in Juelich v. United States,
342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965). Upon denial of a motion to vacate a prior conviction,
the defendant alleged as error the denial of his motion to dismiss appointed counsel
and to appear pro se in the hearing on the motion. Though the court held that
the right was constitutionally protected, it was thought inapplicable in this procedural context because a movant under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964) was not within
the meaning of the sixth amendment "accused" in a "criminal prosecution." Moreover, recognizing that fifth-amendment due process might make the right to counsel
mandatory anyway to insure a "fair and meaningful hearing," the court reasoned that
In such Fifth Amendment cases, it can hardly be argued that there is any
"correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help" for that would imply
the reductio ad absurditon that a hearing not "fair and meaningful" is a
constitutionally protected right. The courts have not yet gone so far.
Id. at 31.
8 See text at notes 12-15 supra.
36
Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1233 (1961).
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herent," 37 "unqualified,"" 8 and "as basic and fundamental as [the] right
to be represented by counsel." 39 Of course, such statements are misleading
since defending pro se will inevitably involve a waiver of the right to
counsel. Therefore, the right is initially curtailed to the extent that the
defendant must be capable of effecting a competent and intelligent waiver. °
This capability cannot alone be inferred from the defendant's capacity to
stand trial since there is a recognized distinction between competency
to stand trial and competency to defend personally,4 1 and "an adjudication
by the trial court that an accused is capable of going to trial and aiding
his counsel, is not a determination of his competency to act as his own
counsel." 4 Thus if it is found that a particular defendant through lack
of knowledge or skill is incapable of comprehending legal issues and conducting his own defense, the court must appoint counsel, even over his
protests, to prevent judicial deterioration;4 to this extent, at least, the
Constitution does indeed force a lawyer upon a defendant.
Whatever his competency, it is clear that a defendant appearing pro se
need not possess any particular legal skills.44 Conversely, in terms of
the consequences of defending himself, an accused does so at his peril
and acquires as a matter of right no greater privileges or latitude than
would an attorney acting for him. Thus a defendant appearing pro se
45
does not become a ward or client of the court, nor must the court give

46
the defendant legal advice, explain potential defenses, or advise the
defendant of the right to ask instructions,4 7 nor generally allow him to
proceed differently than would his attorney. 48 The usual caveat holds
that such a defendant "assumes for all purposes connected with his case,

s Coleman v. Smyth, 166 F. Supp. 934, 937 (E.D. Va. 1958).
United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965).
People v. Sinko, 21 11. 2d 23, 25-26, 171 N.E.2d 9, 10 (1960).
"23 C.J.S. Crim. Law § 979(3) (1961).
' 1 E.g., Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954).
"State v. Kolocotronis, - Wash. 2d -, -, 436 P.2d 774, 781 (1968).
,1 Id. Accord, People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239 (1957) ; McCann
v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 282, 189 N.E.2d 143 (1963).
" E.g., People v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 18, 338 P.2d 397, 405 (1959). Undoubtedly, the fact that the defendant is an attorney is a relevant consideration
when the right is evoked before trial as well as during trial. However, even in the
latter context, defendant's status is not controlling. See, e.g., Duke v. United States,
255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1958).
"Burstein v. United States, 178 F.2d 665, 670 (9th Cir. 1949).
"Michener v. United States, 181 F.2d 911, 918 (8th Cir. 1950).
' State v. Miller, 292 S.W. 440 (Mo. 1927).
,sO'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967).
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and must be prepared to be treated as having, the qualifications and responsibilities concomitant with the role he has undertaken." 4
Once the obstacles of competency and waiver of counsel are met,
the right to defend pro se is relatively unqualified, at least if expressly
asserted before trial."0 However, a further limitation is found in the
rule that a defendant must make an election to appear either pro se or
through counsel and if represented, has no right personally to conduct
all or any part of the case.51 The rights in this context are thought
alternative and distinct-not correlative. A defendant having made the
initial election to proceed in either fashion is not entitled to a hybrid of
the two rights.5"
Illustrative of the distinction is a holding that a defendant appearing
personally has no residual right under the sixth amendment for appointment of counsel in an advisory capacity and that the aforementioned
section 1654," which states the rights alternatively, is not unconstitutional
for this reason."4 A parallel case on the state level reached a similar conclusion despite the fact that the asserted constitutional guarantee was
conjunctive, allowing the right to defend in person and by counsel.5 5
Though a court might permit a defendant represented by counsel to
participate actively in his trial, the practice has been termed undesirable.50
Even in jurisdictions in which the state constitution guarantees the right
to be heard personally, by counsel, or both, there is no absolute right for
a defendant represented by counsel to conduct personally part of his
defense, such as addressing the jury or examining witnesses, the matter
being one of the court's discretion.5 7 The factors held pertinent to this
discretionary decision include the potential interference with orderly
"People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 794, 336 P.2d 937, 949 (1959); accord,
People v. Harmon, 54 Cal. 2d 9, 351 P.2d 329, 4 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1960).
" United States ex rel. Davis v. McMann, 386 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1967) ; United
States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v.
Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963).
1E.g., Egan v. Teets, 251 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1957) ; People v. Mattson, 51 Cal.
2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959) ; People v. Northcott, 209 Cal. 639, 289 P. 634 (1930);
People v. Glenn, 96 Cal. App. 2d 859, 216 P.2d 457 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
" Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1958); State v. Phillip, 261
N.C. 263, 268, 134 S.E.2d 386, 391 (1964).
0028 U.S.C. § 1654 (1964).
" Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953).
People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959).
Brasier v. Jeary, 256 F.2d 474, 478 (8th Cir. 1958).
"Thompson v. State, 194 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Foster v.
State, 148 Tex. Crim. 372, 187 S.W.2d 575 (1945).
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trial practice, the capacity of the accused to conduct his defense, and the

gravity of the offense.5"
The position that a defendant represented by counsel should not be entitled to reap the advantages of both rights by alternating between actively
participating and passively accepting assistance, with the concomitant
disadvantages to the court and prosecution, is probably justified. However,
there remains another context in which the exercise of the right to defend
pro se is similarly cloaked with judicial discretion, but for which the
rationale is less evident. The defendant, as in Seale v. Hoffman,59 proceeds to trial with counsel, but at a later date, for reasons sufficient to
himself if not the court, seeks to dismiss the attorney and to defend pro se
for the balance. In this situation the defendant typically finds, as did
Seale, that a court formerly willing "that he be allowed to go jail under
his own banner if he so desires," 60 had he clearly asserted the right before
trial, is vested with considerable discretionary power to refuse his wishes
because "there must be a showing that the prejudice to the legitimate
interests of the defendant overbalances the potential disruptions of the
proceedings already in progress. '61 In short, if the right to dispense with
a lawyer's help is almost absolute when evoked before trial, it is less so
thereafter and, regardless of its arguably constitutional dimensions, need
62
not be recognized if doing so would disrupt the court's business.
The potential disruption and the possible prejudice to the defendant's
interests if his request is denied are the primary factors to be weighed in
this discretionary decision. 3 Applying these principles to Scale, the court
felt that the defendant's generally contemptuous demeanor and the complexity of the legal issues in his trial militated against a finding of abuse
of discretion.' But it is interesting to note, regarding the question of
"8State v. White, 86 N.J. Super. 410, 419, 207 A.2d 178, 183-84 (Super. Ct.
1965).
" 306 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
"
United States ex rel Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965).
01 Id.
02 United States v. Private Brands, 250 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1957). Accord,
United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Dennis,
183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950). But see United States v. Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241
(6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Johnson, 333 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1964).
"' United States v. Davis, 260 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
" Seale v. Hoffman, 306 F. Supp. 330, 332 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Generally speaking, would it ever be possible to find that a defendant had been prejudiced by
denying him the right to defend himself ? The classic statements argues that
[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
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potential prejudice by not allowing the defendant to proceed pro se, that
Seale's attorney of record was later sentenced to what may be the longest
prison sentence for contemptuous behavior ever imposed in an American
court. 65

While Seale appears secure on the precedents, the case raises the larger
question of the validity of the process by which a right formerly "absolute""" becomes subject to the discretion of the court. One explanation
is that by proceeding to trial with counsel, appointed or retained, the
defendant legally waives his right to later defend pro se. While a few
cases explicitly take this position,67 apparently the more prevalent view
is that the right is merely "qualified" or "sharply curtailed," not waived,
once trial begins.0 8 It is certainly arguable, however, that the right has
effectively, if not legally, vanished at this point.0 9
Apart from the matter of waiver, the "absolute-discretionary" dichotomy seems to be based on the assumption that there is an additional
quantum of trial delay and confusion that would likely result beyond what
would be occasioned had the defendant evoked his right to defend percharged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissable. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
If the defendant were prejudiced by a denial of the right to defend himself, is
not the actual source of error more likely to reside in a lack of effective counsel
than in a denial of the right to defend pro se? See, e.g., Von Moltke v. Gilles, 332
U.S. 708 (1948); Glasser v. United States, 3,15 U.S. 60 (1942). Of course, there
may be certain practical advantages to defending pro se-for example, the opportunity to make unsworn statements to the jury under the aegis of examination of
witnesses without waiver of the immunity against self-incrimination-but it seems
clear that these are not legitimate considerations in the sense that a defendant is
entitled to such advantages. See text at notes 44-49 supra. The cynic might
suspect, not unreasonably, that there is no "balancing" (see text at note 61 supra)
involved at all regarding the discretionary decision of whether to allow a defendant
to discharge his attorney and to appear pro se since all the factors support its
refusal, and that a defendant, having appeared with counsel, has at least de facto
waived his right to dispense with a lawyer's help.
"News and Observer, Raleigh, N.C., Feb. 18, 1970, at 8, col. 6.
as See text at notes 36-39 supra.
"E.g., People v. Ephraim, 411 IIl. 118, 122-23, 103 N.E.2d 363, 365-66 (1952).
E.g., United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965).
, See note 64 supra.

1970]

COMPUTER BUSINESS RECORDS

sonally before trial. Clearly this supposition is valid were there an
absolute privilege to discharge counsel for purposes of substituting another. Such a privilege might easily be abused and continuances and
mistrials made necessary in order not to violate the highly-regarded right
to effective counsel."° But it is less clear that discharge of one's attorney
in order to defend personally would necessarily yield the same result
because this right, unencumbered by the constitutional policy attaching
to the right to counsel, might be conditioned precisely to that extent rather
than disallowed altogether.7 1 Should the defendant's attempt to defend
personally prove confusing to the jury, the defendant, not the prosecution,
likely would be prejudiced. When the court is confronted with an unruly
and contemptuous defendant, the contempt power, judiciously exercised,
should prove a sufficient tool for preserving order and decorum.
One thing for certain can be said about the "absolute-discretionary"
dichotomy. As currently enunciated, it imparts to the right to defend
pro se an evanescent quality not entirely consistent with the actual and
alleged constitutional underpinnings of the right, nor with notions of individual autonomy.
RICHrAD A. LEIPPE

Evidence-Admissibility of Computer Business Records As an
Exception to the Hearsay Rule
Modem businesses have begun increasingly to rely on the electronic
2
digital computer 1 as in integral part of their regular operations. Computers are used to make numerical calculations, to store and process
information on business transactions, to keep personnel records, to perform various accounting tasks, and to summarize many types of information needed for management decisions-in short, they are admirable
receptacles for all types of traditional business records.
'oUnited States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943).
7'Id. at 1011-12 (dissenting opinion). Cf. United States v. Abbamonte, 348
F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1965); Relerford v. United States, 309 F.2d 706 (9th Cir.
1962); United States v. Arlen, 252 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v.
Paccione, 224 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1955).
'For a general discussion of the admission of computer business records into
evidence, see Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1377 (1967). The admission of ordinary business
records into evidence is dealt with in Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 773 (1952).
'Freed, Computer Print-Outs as Evidence, in 16 Am. JuR. PROOF OF FACTS § 1,

at 274 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Freed].

